Skip to main content
PUT
Update a rate-limit policy

Authorizations

​
Authorization
string
header
required

A Barndoor API key, sent as Authorization: Bearer <key>. Keys are prefixed bdai_ and are opaque — do not attempt to decode one. Interchangeable with an OAuth 2.0 access token.

Path Parameters

​
id
string<uuid>
required

Identifier, a UUID

Body

application/json

PATCH semantics for an optional numeric metric — see [super::deserialize_explicit_null].

​
change_note
string | null

Optional free-text note explaining why this edit was made. Omitting it clears any previous note — deliberately not the tri-state merge-patch treatment the fields above get, because the note describes the latest change and carrying an old one forward would explain the wrong edit.

​
enabled
boolean | null
​
name
string | null
​
requests_per_minute
integer<int32> | null
​
scope_id
string<uuid> | null

Tri-state, so an entity-bound policy can be unbound back to "all" (BCP-3955) rather than silently keeping its old binding.

​
scope_type
string | null
​
scope_value
string | null
​
target_mcp_server_id
string<uuid> | null
​
target_model_alias
string | null
​
target_provider_id
string<uuid> | null

BCP-4056: the Target columns are tri-state on update for the same reason the scope columns are — a policy that gained a target must be able to lose it again. Safe to retarget in place (unlike a budget, whose period counter would be orphaned) because a rate-limit window is 60s and self-heals.

​
target_upstream_model
string | null
​
tokens_per_minute
integer<int32> | null
​
traffic_type
string | null

Response

The requested record

An admin-API response for an entity whose core type lives in ai_governance and so cannot carry portal-only columns.

TokenBudget and RateLimitPolicy are read by the enforcement path on every request; hanging five display-only fields off them would put portal concerns in the hot path's type and force every governance consumer to carry them. Wrapping instead keeps the enforcement reads (get_enabled_by_org and friends) returning the bare governance type, while the admin reads return this.

Both halves are #[serde(flatten)], so the wire shape stays the flat object the portal already consumes — same choice AdminModelPricing makes.

​
enabled
boolean
required
​
id
string<uuid>
required
​
name
string
required
​
org_id
string<uuid>
required
​
scope_type
enum<string>
required

Scope is the identity axis of a budget or rate-limit policy — "who is this policy for?". The what (LLM provider, upstream model name, model alias) lives on dedicated target_* columns on the row (BCP-2813), not as a scope value. LlmProvider and Model remain in the enum because rate_limit_policies and model_access_policies still accept them in their scope_type CHECK constraints (V12 / V18 / V22 widenings — a separate scope of work to clean up). For token budgets the CHECK was tightened back to identity-only by V41__budget_scope_target.sql, so any LlmProvider/Model budget row that survived would simply fail to match in BudgetEnforcer::matched_keys.

Available options:
org,
team,
user,
project,
api_key,
mcp_server,
llm_provider,
model,
agent,
role,
group
​
traffic_type
enum<string>
required
Available options:
all,
llm,
mcp
​
member_of_group
string | null

BCP-3814 membership filter: when set, this policy only applies to requesters whose IdP group membership includes this group name.

Only meaningful on a broad user-scoped policy (scope_type == User with scope_id and scope_value both None), where the counter key resolves to the requesting user's id — so one policy row gives every member of the group their own RPM/TPM allowance, and a user joining the group is limited on their next request with no admin action. DB-enforced by rate_limit_policies_member_of_group_requires_broad_user (V66, tightened to exclude scope_value by V67).

None ⇒ org-wide (the pre-BCP-3814 behaviour). Contrast with a ScopeType::Group policy, which keys its counter by the group name and so pools one limit across all members.

​
requests_per_minute
integer<int32> | null
​
scope_id
string<uuid> | null
​
scope_value
string | null
​
target_mcp_server_id
string<uuid> | null

BCP-4056 Target dimension: when set, the policy only fires on requests routed to this MCP server. The MCP-traffic counterpart of target_provider_id, and mutually exclusive with all three LLM target columns (DB-enforced by rate_limit_policies_mcp_target_exclusive_check) — no single request carries both an MCP server and an LLM route, so a row naming both could never match.

Distinct from a ScopeType::McpServer policy, which puts the server on the identity axis and so cannot be combined with a user or group. Unlike the other two object-shaped scopes, that one does work — it moves here for consistency and to make "this user's rpm on this server" expressible, not to fix a defect.

​
target_model_alias
string | null

BCP-4056 Target dimension: when set, the policy only fires when the requested model alias (request.model) equals this value. Mutually exclusive with the other two LLM target_* fields.

Together with target_provider_id/target_upstream_model this replaces ScopeType::Model, which could never match anything: GovernanceIdentity::scope_keys() deliberately emits no (Model, _) pair, so a model-scoped policy rendered as Enabled while enforcing nothing.

​
target_provider_id
string<uuid> | null

BCP-4056 Target dimension: when set, the policy only fires on routes whose provider id equals this value. May be combined with target_upstream_model to limit a single model on this provider; mutually exclusive with target_model_alias (DB-enforced by rate_limit_policies_alias_target_exclusive_check).

This replaces ScopeType::LlmProvider as the way to express "limit this provider". That scope never worked on the check path — the gateway middleware builds its identity with no llm_provider_id, so no (LlmProvider, _) scope key exists to match against, while the post-response record path does carry one and wrote usage to a counter nothing read.

​
target_upstream_model
string | null

BCP-4056 Target dimension refining target_provider_id: when set, the policy only fires on routes whose resolved upstream model name equals this value (string match). Always set alongside a provider (V74 CHECK-enforced) — a bare upstream name would string every provider serving that model into one limit.

​
tokens_per_minute
integer<int32> | null
​
created_by_email
string | null
​
created_by_name
string | null
​
created_by_user_id
string<uuid> | null
​
last_change_note
string | null

Optional free text explaining why the last change was made ("Raised for the Q3 batch job", "Vendor deprecated the old endpoint").

Admin-authored and rendered in the portal, so it is untrusted input: length-capped here, escaped on render.

​
last_modified_at
string<date-time> | null

When the change named by last_modified_by_* happened.

Its own column rather than the row's updated_at, because updated_at is bumped by writes nobody is attributed for -- pairing the two would date a named admin's edit to a background job's clock. See the V75 migration for the full reasoning.

​
last_modified_by_email
string | null
​
last_modified_by_name
string | null
​
last_modified_by_user_id
string<uuid> | null