List the organization's rate-limit policys

Scope is the identity axis of a budget or rate-limit policy — "who is this policy for?". The what (LLM provider, upstream model name, model alias) lives on dedicated target_* columns on the row (BCP-2813), not as a scope value. LlmProvider and Model remain in the enum because rate_limit_policies and model_access_policies still accept them in their scope_type CHECK constraints (V12 / V18 / V22 widenings — a separate scope of work to clean up). For token budgets the CHECK was tightened back to identity-only by V41__budget_scope_target.sql, so any LlmProvider/Model budget row that survived would simply fail to match in BudgetEnforcer::matched_keys.

BCP-3814 membership filter: when set, this policy only applies to requesters whose IdP group membership includes this group name.

Only meaningful on a broad user-scoped policy (scope_type == User with scope_id and scope_value both None), where the counter key resolves to the requesting user's id — so one policy row gives every member of the group their own RPM/TPM allowance, and a user joining the group is limited on their next request with no admin action. DB-enforced by rate_limit_policies_member_of_group_requires_broad_user (V66, tightened to exclude scope_value by V67).

None ⇒ org-wide (the pre-BCP-3814 behaviour). Contrast with a ScopeType::Group policy, which keys its counter by the group name and so pools one limit across all members.

BCP-4056 Target dimension: when set, the policy only fires on requests routed to this MCP server. The MCP-traffic counterpart of target_provider_id, and mutually exclusive with all three LLM target columns (DB-enforced by rate_limit_policies_mcp_target_exclusive_check) — no single request carries both an MCP server and an LLM route, so a row naming both could never match.

Distinct from a ScopeType::McpServer policy, which puts the server on the identity axis and so cannot be combined with a user or group. Unlike the other two object-shaped scopes, that one does work — it moves here for consistency and to make "this user's rpm on this server" expressible, not to fix a defect.

BCP-4056 Target dimension: when set, the policy only fires when the requested model alias (request.model) equals this value. Mutually exclusive with the other two LLM target_* fields.

Together with target_provider_id/target_upstream_model this replaces ScopeType::Model, which could never match anything: GovernanceIdentity::scope_keys() deliberately emits no (Model, _) pair, so a model-scoped policy rendered as Enabled while enforcing nothing.

BCP-4056 Target dimension: when set, the policy only fires on routes whose provider id equals this value. May be combined with target_upstream_model to limit a single model on this provider; mutually exclusive with target_model_alias (DB-enforced by rate_limit_policies_alias_target_exclusive_check).

This replaces ScopeType::LlmProvider as the way to express "limit this provider". That scope never worked on the check path — the gateway middleware builds its identity with no llm_provider_id, so no (LlmProvider, _) scope key exists to match against, while the post-response record path does carry one and wrote usage to a counter nothing read.

BCP-4056 Target dimension refining target_provider_id: when set, the policy only fires on routes whose resolved upstream model name equals this value (string match). Always set alongside a provider (V74 CHECK-enforced) — a bare upstream name would string every provider serving that model into one limit.

Optional free text explaining why the last change was made ("Raised for the Q3 batch job", "Vendor deprecated the old endpoint").

Admin-authored and rendered in the portal, so it is untrusted input: length-capped here, escaped on render.

When the change named by last_modified_by_* happened.

Its own column rather than the row's updated_at, because updated_at is bumped by writes nobody is attributed for -- pairing the two would date a named admin's edit to a background job's clock. See the V75 migration for the full reasoning.